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Abstract
The Swedish comprehensive school reform implied an extension of the
number of years of compulsory school from 7 or 8 to 9 for the entire nation
and was implemented as a social experiment by municipality between
1949 and 1962. A previous study (Meghir and Palme, 2005) has shown
that this reform signi￿cantly increased the number of years of schooling
as well as labor earnings of the children who went through the post reform
school system, in particular for individuals originating from homes with
low educated fathers. This study estimates the impact of the reform on
criminal behavior: both within the generation directly a￿ected by the
reform as well as their children. We use census data on all born in Sweden
between 1945 and 1955 and all their children merged with individual
register data on all convictions between 1981 and 2008. We ￿nd that
the educational reform decreased crime substantially for men who were
directly a￿ected by it. We also ￿nd that the crime rate declined for the
sons of those fathers directly a￿ected by the new educational system;
we interpret this results as implying that improved education increased
resource and parenting quality, leading to improved child outcomes.
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11 Introduction
Crime imposes huge costs on society and policies to prevent crime are debated
around the world. In addition to police resources and punishment of criminals,
these policies typically involve public spending on creating alternative labor out-
comes for individuals potentially involved in criminal activities, e.g. reforms of
national education systems. Since criminal behavior has an exceptionally strong in-
tergenerational link, such policies may have an e￿ect across generations. Although
there is a very large previous literature showing that low educated people are more
likely to be convicted and that their children are more likely to commit crimes, very
few studies have attempted to show a causal relation between own education and
criminal behavior and (to our knowledge) no previous study has shown a causal
relation between parental education and criminal behavior.
In this paper we study to what extent a major national education reform, which
increased schooling and earnings, also a￿ected criminal behavior: Both in the gen-
eration directly a￿ected by the reform as well as their children. The reform in ques-
tion is the Swedish comprehensive school reform, which included an extension of
the number of years of compulsory schooling and was implemented gradually across
the 1,055 Swedish municipalities during the 1950s, before ￿nally being rolled out
nationally in 1962. As described in Meghir and Palme (2005), the implementation
of the reform allows us to investigate its impact on crime by comparing individuals
living and working in the same labour market but having been exposed to di￿erent
schooling systems. Moreover, we can also estimate the impact of the reform on their
own children. In this case we are able to consider how changing the educational
experience of the parents can a￿ect important outcomes for their children. Beyond
the obvious public policy implications, the results speak to the growing literature
2on the importance of parenting quality on child outcomes.
Two earlier papers by Lochner and Moretti (2004) and Machin, Marie, and Vu-
ji¢ (2010) respectively study the relation between compulsory schooling laws and
criminal behavior. Lochner and Moretti (2004) use changes in compulsory schooling
laws across time between US states to identify the e￿ect of increasing education on
crime. Machin, Marie, and Vuji¢ (2010) compare criminal behavior of the cohorts
just before and just after the implementation of the comprehensive school system
in Britain. Our paper goes further in two important ways. First, we compare the
criminal behavior of two groups, distinguished by the school system they were ex-
posed to, but active in the same labor markets at the same point in time, and who
belong to the same cohort. As a result any general equilibrium e￿ects of the reforms
are eliminated, as they are common across groups - what we identify is the impact
of being exposed to alternative educational systems, over and above the macroeco-
nomic e￿ects that result from this. However, the key distinguishing feature of our
paper is that we consider the e￿ects on the criminal activity of the children of those
a￿ected by the reform. As we discuss later, the e￿ects in this case will operate
through improved parenting and investments in children.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses previous theoretical and
empirical work on the relation between both own education and criminal behavior
as well as parental education and criminal behavior; Section 3 provides an overview
of the comprehensive school reform in Sweden; Section 4 describes the data and
presents empirical results on the relation between educational attainments and crim-
inal behavior as well as intergenerational associations of crime; Section 5 discusses
our identi￿cation strategy; Section 6 presents our empirical results on the e￿ect of
the comprehensive school reform and the probability of being convicted for crime or
3sentenced to prison; Section 7 concludes.
2 The Impact of Education on Crime
2.1 The Impact of Education on Crime within a Generation
The links between economic incentives and crime have been established both theo-
retically and empirically in earlier studies. A prominent example is Freeman (1999)
who outlines an economic model of crime where the choice between criminal and le-
gal activity is determined by comparing the expected utility of each. Grogger (1998),
Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) and Machin and Meghir (2004) demonstrate
the importance of wages and labour market opportunities in driving crime. One im-
plication of this is that improved education may reduce crime. A number of papers
have looked at the link between education and crime directly.
These include Lochner and Moretti (2004) and Machin, Marie, and Vuji¢ (2010),
cited above. A more theoretically based approach was o￿ered by Lochner (2004)
who develops a life cycle model of education and crime and estimates a negative
education-crime relationship. A study, based on this capital approach by Williams
and Sickles (2002) ￿nds that years of schooling has a signi￿cant negative e￿ect
on crime in adulthood, and that there is a relationship between crime and other
measures of human capital. Earlier studies support this empirical evidence on the
education-crime relationship; for example Freeman (1996) states for the 1991 US
Census that two thirds of US prison inmates are high-school drop-outs and 12 per-
cent of 24-35 year old high school drop outs were incarcerated in 1993. This negative
correlation between crime and education has also been documented in the the crim-
inology and sociology literature, for example Sabates and Feinstein (2008a). 1
1See also Sabates and Feinstein (2008b).
4Gallipoli and Fella (2006) estimate a general equilibrium model of crime and
education. They ￿nd that increases in education have a signi￿cant impact in reduc-
ing crime. However, they point out that the general equilibrium e￿ects, operating
through changes in wages as the number of educated individuals increases, can be
substantial.
2.2 The E￿ects of Parental Education on Children’s Criminal
Behavior
Intergenerational associations of criminal behavior have been documented in the
criminology literature. From the economics point of view this question relates to
the investments that parents make on their children and the way that parental
education may a￿ect such investments (see Becker (1981)). 2
Of particular interest to our study are the two recent papers by Hjalmarsson and
Lindquist (2010a) and Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2010b). The ￿rst documents a
strong correlation between crime of fathers and children of both genders in Sweden
using the Stockholm Birth Cohort Study, which is a data set that consists of all
individuals born in 1953 and living in Stockholm in November 1963, containing
crime records of the birth cohort and their fathers. The second study focuses on
parent-child correlations in crime using adoption data. In particular they aim to
determine through which factors mothers and fathers in￿uence child criminality,
which is closely related to the study by Bj￿rklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006).
2For some empirical work see for example Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey (2007). Moreover, there
is direct evidence that better childhood environments and early education can reduce crime rates,
see for example the results form the Perry pre-school experiment presented in Schweinhart, Montie,
Xiang, Barnett, Bel￿eld, and Nores (2005) and Cunha and Heckman (2007).
52.3 Human Capital and participation in Crime - a simple
framework
To better understand the mechanisms through which educational reform can a￿ect
participation in crime for both generations consider the following simple model.
Human capital is produced by investments in various stages of the child’s life as
well as by overall educational attainment Ec. Suppose there are two stages, early
investments I0 and investments during schooling I1: The e￿ciency of investments




I0 > 0; H0
I1 > 0; H0
Ec > 0 and H00
I0 < 0; H00
I1 < 0; H00
Ec < 0. Parents are
assumed to care about child quality, which here is just their human capital. Ignoring
dynamics for simplicity, they solve the problem 3
max
C;I0;I1
fu(C;H) st C + I0 + I1 = Y
p and H = H(I0;I1;EcjEp)g
where C is parental consumption. In this simple context investments in children
will increase as parental resources Y P increase, so long as H is a normal good. The











An increase in the marginal productivity of such investments (say due to an increase
3The problem is dynamic sequential, but nothing would be gained in introducing this notation
here.
6in parental education Ep) will lead to more investments in the children at both
stages. This will happen both because the productivity of investments may increase
and because parental resources Y P go up. The next step is to see how these changes
can a￿ect participation in crime.
Consider a very simple model of crime choice in two stages of life. First, is the
educational stage, where the individual can either engage in education, crime or
work. Then follows the adult stage where there is no education choice. We start by
the latter.
Committing a crime is a period by period decision with no dynamics (for sim-
plicity). Working leads to income Y (H) which depends on human capital H. Crime
on the other hand yields a return R with some probability p(H). Being caught,
with probability 1   p(H) leads to punishment K(H): As discussed in Lochner and
Moretti (2004), the dependence of K on H represents the opportunity cost of be-
ing incarcerated. Moreover, it also costs c(H) to participate. This cost can re￿ect
the aversion that one may have to anti-social behaviour. We assume that c(H) is
increasing in H.
Participation in crime is determined by the condition
p(H)R   (1   p(H))K(H)   c(H)   Y (H) > 0 () engage in crime
An increase in H will increase earnings Y (H) and participation costs c(H), both
implying a reduction in crime. A possible mitigating e￿ect is that better human
capital may make crime more e￿ective and reduce the probability of capture p(H).
In our empirical analysis we only measure convictions; we assume that a reduction
in convictions re￿ects a reduction in crime participation and not more e￿ective
7criminals. Thus, other than the potential e￿ect on p(H), increasing human capital
will decrease participation in crime.
It is also useful to consider the earlier period, when the individual still has the op-
tion of being in school. De￿ne the future value as V (H1) = E max;w(V (H1);V w(H1))
with V  denoting the value of crime and V w the value for work. ced(H0) denotes
the cost of education, which we assume are declining in H0 (initial human capital).
In this ￿rst period the value of education, crime and work respectively are given by
V ed =  ced(H0) + V (H
+
1 )
V w = Y (H0) + V (H0)
V k = p(H0)R   (1   p(H0))K(H0)   c(H0) + V (H0)
where H
+
1 denotes that education allows the individual to enter the next period with
higher human capital. The individual choose the activity with the greatest value.
First, note that if schooling is compulsory, then there is a mechanical reduction in
crime, simply because the opportunity to commit an o￿ence is no longer there (or
reduced in practice). Second, an increase in human capital will increase the value
of both schooling and work; the former because it will reduce the costs of schooling
ced(H0) as well as the future value V (H
+
1 ), the latter because it will increase the
current wage as well as the future value V (H0). So ￿rst period crime will decline;
whether education will go up is in this context ambiguous.
We can now summarise the way that educational reform and compulsory school-
ing in particular can a￿ect crime across generations. Meghir and Palme (2005)
document the impact of the reform on educational attainment and earnings. For
8understanding the impact of the reform they emphasise the importance of distin-
guishing individuals a￿ected by the reform with parents with just the statutory level
of education (60% in that population) to those whose parents had attained a higher
level.
An increase in compulsory schooling reduces the available time for crime early on;
it increases human capital and thus reduces further the incentive to commit crimes
and may increase the chance of remaining in school beyond the new compulsory
level. It may also draw increased investments I1 from parents further increasing
H: This reduces crime in the young (school period) ages. As an adult, the result is
increased human capital, which as explained before, will reduce adult crime. If there
is a habit formation aspect of crime (not included above), the early decline will be
reinforced. Thus crime will decline relative to the group that was not a￿ected by
the reform.
The children of the a￿ected generation are all experiencing the same education
system because the reform was rolled out nationally in 1962. They di￿er by the
fact that some have parents who faced the new education system and as a result
have more parental education and more resources Y p. These di￿erences will lead
to higher I0, I1, and eventually higher educational attainment Ec relative to the
children in the comparison group, whose parents did not go through the reform.
Educational attainment Ec may increase because, according to mounting evidence,
an increase in early investments I0 improves cognition and social skills and hence
reduces the costs of education. In addition the increased resources Y p allow more
transfers to children alleviating somewhat ￿nancial constraints for education. These
channels imply an increase in both H0 and H1 reducing crimes at all life stages, as
described above.
9For individuals a￿ected by the reform but having parents with more than statu-
tory education the impact is less clear cut. For this group there is no e￿ect on
educational attainment. However it changed the way they were educated because it
abolished early selection and tracking, which a￿ected primarily this group. It can
be argued that quality of education for this group was diluted for this reason and
because the increase in compulsory schooling, a￿ecting the other group, could have
reduced the quality of the peers. For this reason we cannot be con￿dent that H
increased for this group. This is why in our empirical analysis we present overall
results as well as results separately on the lower socio-economic group.
3 The 1950 Education Reform and the Social Ex-
periment
3.1 The Swedish school system before and after the reform
Prior to the implementation of the comprehensive school reform, pupils attended a
common basic compulsory school (folkskolan) until grade six. After the sixth grade
pupils were selected to either continue one or, in mainly urban areas, two years in
the basic compulsory school, or to attend the three year junior secondary school
(realskolan). The selection of pupils into the two di￿erent school tracks was based
on their past performance, measured by grades. The pre-reform compulsory school
was in most cases administered at the municipality level. The junior secondary
school was a prerequisite for the subsequent upper secondary school, which was
itself required for higher education.
In 1948 a parliamentary school committee proposed a school reform that im-
10plemented a new nine-year compulsory comprehensive school. 4 The comprehensive
school reform had three main elements:
1. An extension of the number of years of compulsory schooling to 9 years in the
entire country.
2. Abolition of early selection. Although pupils in the comprehensive schools were
able to choose between three tracks after the sixth grade - one track including
vocational training, a general track, and an academic level preparing for later
upper secondary school - they were kept in common schools and classes until
the ninth grade.
3. Introduction of a national curriculum. The pre-reform compulsory schools
were administrated by municipalities and the pre-reform curriculum varied
between municipalities.
3.2 The Social Experiment
The social experiment with the new comprehensive nine-year compulsory school
started during an assessment period between 1949 and 1962, when the ￿nal cur-
riculum was decided.5 The proposed new school system, as described above, was
introduced in municipalities or parts of city communities, which in 1952 numbered
1,055 (including 18 city communities). The selection of municipalities was not ran-
dom. However, the decision to select the areas was based on an attempt to choose
areas that were representative for the entire country, both in terms of demographics
as well as geographically. At ￿rst the National Board of Education contacted the
4The school reform and its development are described in Meghir and Palme (2003), Meghir and
Palme (2005), and Holmlund (2007). For more detailed reference on the reform, see Marklund
(1980) and Marklund (1981).
5The o￿cial evaluation National School Board (1959) was mainly of administrative nature.
Details on this evaluation are also described in Marklund (1981).
11municipalities, or sometimes they themselves applied to participate. From this pool
of applicants a "representative" sample of municipalities was chosen. Table 12 in
the Appendix shows the take up rates of the reform between 1949 and 1962. In
our analysis we consider cohorts born between 1945 and 1955. Figure 1 shows the
number of observations in each one-year birth cohort and the proportion assigned
to the reform.
Figure 1: Proportion of individuals in sample assigned to the reform
4 The Data
4.1 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
We use a sample originally obtained from Sweden’s population census. To link
individuals across generations we used the multi-generation register, provided by
Statistics Sweden.6 We are able to link and use three generations in our analysis:
6Statistics Sweden(2003) Flergenerationregistret 2002. En beskrivning av inneh￿ll och kvalitet.
Statistics Sweden. Avdelning f￿r Befolknings och V￿lf￿rdsstatistik.
12the parent generation which is the generation directly a￿ected by the reform and
it consists of all individuals born in Sweden between 1945 and 1955, their parents
the grandparent generation, and the children generation which are the children of
the parent generation.7 This corresponds to 1,340,857 persons, 658,056 males and
655,801 females in the parent generation. From the birth certi￿cates we know gender,
date and parish of birth. We restrict our sample of the children of the parent
generation, the children generation, to those who have reached the age of criminal
responsibility (age 15) in 2008, the last year for which we have crime records. This
corresponds to 1,621,758 children, 833,564 sons and 788,194 daughters in the children
generation that were born between 1959 and 1991.
The reform assignment variable is obtained in two steps. First, we use the name
of the church parish of birth in order to obtain the municipality code according to the
1953 Swedish municipality division. Second, based on the year and municipality of
birth, we use an algorithm based on historical evidence on reform implementation in
each municipality provided by Helena Holmlund and described in Holmlund (2007)
to assign reform status to each individual in the sample.
Information on the individual’s highest education level was obtained and matched
on to our sample from the Swedish National Education Register. For the grandpar-
ent generation we used data from the 1970 census, which only provides information
on individuals younger than age 60 in the year of the census, allowing us to obtain
education information for 78.4 percent of mothers and for 65.8 percent of fathers
of the parent generation. We analyze the e￿ects of the reform separately for those
individuals originating from the low educated grandparent generation . This is de-
￿ned as those individuals of the grandparent generation with the lowest pre-reform
7Even though we have information on biological and adoptive parents and children, we exclude
all individuals who have been adopted, or who have adopted children themselves.
13statutory level of compulsory schooling. Hence, we analyze the e￿ects of the reform
separately for the parent generation with low educated fathers, and for the children
generation with low educated grandfathers, which amounts to roughly 63-65 percent
of the sample with available education information. 8
Information on all convictions in entire Sweden covering the time period between
1981 and 2008 is provided by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention
(Br￿) and has been linked to individuals in our data set. One conviction/court trial
often covers several crimes. We have detailed information on the number of crimes
the person has been convicted for in each trial, the date of conviction, as well as the
penalty for each crime.
Table 1: Number of all convictions in Sweden 1981-2008, for cohorts
born 1945-1955 and their children
Ever convicted Ever convicted to prison
Male Female Male Female
Parent generation
Number 173,395 46,633 36,870 3,126
Percent 25.31 7.11 5.38 0.48
Low educated fathers
Number 68,860 16,673 14,525 1,255
Percent 23.96 6.11 5.05 0.46
Children generation
Number 220,494 69,843 28,588 2,001
Percent 26.45 8.86 3.43 0.25
Low educated paternal grandfathers
Number 64,976 20,183 7,361 482
Percent 24.68 8.12 2.80 0.19
Low educated maternal grandfathers
Number 76,887 22,621 9,554 625
Percent 27.78 8.65 3.45 0.24
Notes: We only report the number of convicted children for low educated
grandfathers, on both sides of the family.
8Table 13 in the data appendix summarizes the number of available observations in each gen-
eration and subgroup.
14Table 1 shows the number of convicted persons for the two generations, the 1945-
1955 cohorts and their children, covered by our data on convictions. Over this time
window, 25 percent of all males in the parent generation have been convicted at least
once, and over 5 percent have been to prison. Only 7 percent of women have been
convicted, and 0.5 percent have received a prison sentence. Importantly, the data on
criminal convictions only cover the time range between 1981 to 2008, which means
that the generations born between 1945 and 1955 will be between the ages of 26 to
63, whereas their children’s convictions cover the ages of 15 to 49. The picture for
the children generation looks very similar to the one of their parents, with slightly
higher percentages of the population having been convicted, possibly attributable
to the younger age window. Conviction rates for those with low educated fathers
or grandfathers are presented in the lower panel of Table 1. This shows, perhaps
surprisingly, that the conviction rates are only marginally higher for this group than
for the whole population.
Table 14 in the data appendix shows the crime-age distribution for the entire
data set not only covering the cohorts of interest. The largest amount of convictions
are for people between 15 and 24, followed by the age range 25 to 34, and further
decreasing with age. This pattern of convictions by age is also shown in ￿gures
1 and 2 in the appendix that show the average rate of convictions by age and by
cohorts for the cohorts 1970-1989 using men in our children sample.
The stated conviction rates for men of roughly 25 percent is a surprisingly high
proportion of the population, which prompted us to look into this in greater detail.
First, note that the type of crimes included in our data have to be severe enough
to involve a trial and a conviction in court. This includes the more serious tra￿c
violations such as driving without a licence, driving under the in￿uence of alcohol or
15drugs, and causing bodily harm, but does not include speeding or parking tickets.
As such they do represent serious anti-social behavior. Unfortunately, we were not
yet given the speci￿c type of crime for which an individual in our data has been
convicted for.9 However, a good idea of the composition of crime can be obtained
in Table 16 in the data appendix where we show a breakdown of type of crime
convictions in 2009.
In addition to the data on convictions we have data on all suspected crimes be-
tween 1991 and 2009. It includes a variable that gives a detailed code on the type
of suspected crime.10 Although this data overstates actual charges and crimes we
use it to provide an idea of the distribution of tra￿c crimes. Table 17 presents all
categories that are related to tra￿c violations and the number of o￿ences between
January 1991 and June 2009. The total number of suspected crimes during this time
were 4,073,985 of which 16.9 percent were tra￿c crimes. Again, all of these tra￿c
crime categories are severe violations. Additional support of such high conviction
rates in Sweden is provided by previous studies that have shown similar convic-
tion rates, see Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2010a) and Hjalmarsson and Lindquist
(2010b).
4.2 The Association of Education, Family and Criminal Be-
havior
Table 2 shows the Linear Probability Model estimation results of whether an indi-
vidual has ever been convicted (column (1)) and ever been convicted to a prison
sentence (column (2)) on years of own schooling as well as on years of father’s and
9We are waiting to obtain a variable that indicates the type of crime from the Br￿ crime registry.
10Detailed coding of crime types in: Kodning av brott, Anvisningar och regler, Version 8.0,
Reviderad 1. Juli 2010, br￿ brottsf￿rebyggande r￿det.
16mother’s schooling for the children generation. The estimations for the sample of
men born in Sweden between 1945 and 1955 are presented in the upper panel A,
and the ones for the sons in the lower panel B. All regression models include both a
full set of dummy variables for the birth cohorts and birth municipalities to control
for area and cohort ￿xed e￿ects. 11 Column (1) in panel A shows that one year of
own schooling for men in the parent generation is associated with a decrease of the
probability of a conviction by 1.9 percentage points, which translates to a reduction
in the conviction rate of 7.5 percent. One year of schooling for men decreases the
probability of a prison sentence by 0.8 percentage points, or a reduction in the total
share of men convicted to prison by 15 percent, see column (2). Panel B includes
own schooling and both parents’ education for sons, and hence estimates the e￿ect of
an increase of schooling of one parent controlling for assortative mating e￿ects. One
year of own schooling is associated with a 2.64 (0.59) percentage points decrease in
the probability of sons’ conviction (imprisonment), corresponding to a 9.96 (17.06)
percent reduction in the share of convicted (imprisoned) sons. A years decrease in
father’s schooling is associated with an increase in the son’s conviction rate (prison
rate) of 0.568 (0.118) percentage points or equivalently a 2.15 (3.44) percent reduc-
tion in the share of convicted (imprisoned) sons. The equivalent ￿gure for a decrease
in mother’s education by a year is a 2.261 (4.198) percent decrease in the share of
convicted (imprisoned) sons.
We present the relationship between crime and the levels of education in the data
appendix (see Tables 18 and 19), revealing a steep decline in crime participation
associated with higher levels of own and parental education. A similar decline is
also recorded for incarceration rates.
11When computing the standard errors we cluster by birth municipality, which is conservative
and makes the standard errors comparable to the ones we estimate for the e￿ect of the reform
below.
17Table 3 shows the results of a Probit model of the association between having
a father who has been convicted (or to prison) and the father’s age of birth on the
probability of his son ever been convicted (or to prison). The probability of ever
been convicted increases by over 15 percentage points if a son has a convicted father.
This corresponds to a 63 percent increase of the total share of convicted sons. If
he had a father who had been convicted to a prison sentence the probability of an
own prison sentence increases by over 7 percentage points, which translates to a 134
percent increase in the share of convicted sons.
Overall, there is a large and signi￿cant negative correlation between own edu-
cation and own criminal participation, both for the probability of a conviction and
the probability of a conviction to prison. This holds for two subsequent generations.
Furthermore, our evidence strongly supports the notion that higher education of
both mothers and fathers is associated with a lower probability that their sons will
be engaged in crime. Finally, we ￿nd a strong and highly signi￿cant positive inter-
generational link between father’s and son’s criminal behavior.
18Table 2: Linear probability model estimates of the association between own or
father’s education and the probability of being convicted and the probability of
being convicted to a prison sentence. Men born between 1945-1955 and their sons.
Panel A Men born 45-55
Dependent variables Probability conviction Probability prison
 p = 0:2531  p = 0:0538
Years of schooling, own -1.916*** -0.806***
(0.093) (0.057)
Corresponding percentage change -7.570 -14.981
Birth cohort/municipality dummies y y
Observations 662,875 662,875
Panel B Sons of men born 45-55
Dependent variables Probability conviction Probability prison
 p = 0:2645  p = 0:0343
Years of schooling, own -2.635*** -0.585***
(0.029) (0.013)
Corresponding percentage change -9.962 -17.055
Years of schooling, father -0.568*** -0.118***
(0.035) (0.014)
Corresponding percentage change -2.147 -3.440
Years of schooling, mother -0.598*** -0.144***
(0.026) (0.009)
Corresponding percentage change -2.261 -4.198
Birth cohort/municipality dummies y y
Observations 675,625 675,625
Notes: Results are scaled by 100. Level of observation in upper panel are men born in Sweden
between 1945 and 1955. Level of observation in lower panel are sons of parents born between
1945 and 1955. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by birth municipality. All
regressions in the upper panel include a full set of birth cohort dummies and birth municipality
dummies. In the lower panel a full set of municipality dummies and birth cohort dummies of
the child was included. Signi￿cance levels *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
19Table 3: Probit model marginal e￿ects of the association between the probability of
ever been convicted and the father having ever been convicted. Marginal e￿ects are
scaled by 100. Estimations for di￿erent education levels of grandfathers. Sons of men
born in Sweden between 1945 and 1955.
Panel A Sons of men born 45-55
Dependent variables Probability conviction Probability prison
 p = 0:245  p = 0:054
Father convicted/Father prison 15.457*** 7.248***
(0.260) (0.183 )
Percent change 63.090 134.222
Age of father at birth of son -1.759*** -0.323 ***
(0.019) (0.007)
Observations 559,085 559,085
Panel B Sons of men born 45-55 with low educated father
Dependent variables Probability conviction Probability prison
 p = 0:245  p = 0:021
Father convicted/Father prison 14.755*** 7.116***
(0.245) (0.243)
Percent change 60.224 338.857
Age of father at birth of son -1.765*** -0.315***
(0.022) (0.007)
Observations 241,716 241,716
Notes: Level of observation in upper panel are sons of men born in Sweden between 1945 and 1955,
and in the lower panel sons of men born between 1945 and 1955 who have a low educated father.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by birth municipality of sons. All regressions
include a full set of birth cohort dummies of fathers. Signi￿cance levels *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
205 Identi￿cation Strategy
The main outcome variable we use is whether an individual was ever convicted
during the observation window 1981-2008. We also consider whether someone has
ever received a prison sentence. Finally, we consider the number of convictions.
All the analysis is done for males only and we distinguish them by the education
of the grandparent generation. We present two sets of estimates. The ￿rst relate
to the impact of the reform on the parent generation, i.e. the generation a￿ected
by the educational reform directly. The second relate to the impact of the reform
on the children of the parent generation. Referring back to the discussion on how
the reform a￿ects crime, for the parent generation the estimated impact related to
adult crime only because the youngest person in the sample is 26 when the crime
records start. Hence, the e￿ect is not attributable to the simply keeping the kids o￿
the streets by getting them to attend school. For the child generation the impact
is attributable to better parenting and increased investments in children; it is not
due to di￿erences in the schooling system they are facing, which is the same for the
treatment and comparison group children.
If the reform had been randomised we could just compare crime rates across
treatment and control municipalities at each point in time. However such randomi-
sation did not take place and as a result we need further identifying assumptions so
as to account for potential di￿erences across treatment and control municipalities.




where t denotes cohort and  denotes unobserved heterogeneity. As in Athey and
21Imbens (2006) and Altonji and Blank (1999) the key assumptions are that (i) the
distribution of , while di￿ering across municipalities, does not change from cohort
to cohort and (ii) F is strictly monotonic in . These "di￿erence-in-di￿erences"
assumptions are su￿cient to identify the impact of the reform, but do imply restric-
tions on the model for crime participation equation 2.3. In particular it requires that
if there is any unobserved heterogeneity, whose distribution depends on the munici-
pality, this has to be summarised by a single unobserved factor, say entering through
human capital, and whose distribution is the same across cohorts; the propensity
to commit a crime must be strictly monotonically related to this unobserved factor.
In practice this assumes that increases in human capital always reduce crime and
that this is never reversed by the reduction in the probability of being caught, which
does not seem to be a very strong assumption.
With a discrete outcome variable, such as ours we need additional assumptions if
we are to obtain a point estimate. 12 We thus assume that heterogeneity and cohort
e￿ects are additively separable and we use both the linear probability model and
the logit model as alternative distributional assumptions. Speci￿cally we assume
y







i;m;t is the latent crime "intensity" outcome observed for person i born in
municipality m and in birth cohort t. A conviction corresponds to y
i;m;t > 0. Ri;m;t
is the reform indicator, which equals one if individual i belongs to a municipal-
ity and cohort that has been assigned to the new school system; ti is a vector of
dummy variables indicating to which cohort individual i belongs to and Mi is a
vector of dummy variables indicating in which municipality individual i was born.
12This is the case with all papers that employ di￿erence-in-di￿erences analysis of discrete out-
comes (see Athey and Imbens (2006)).
22Identi￿cation follows by assuming that
E(i;m;tjRi;m;t;ti;Mi) = 0:
The key assumptions are that the distribution of the unobservables are invariant
over time and that the crime trends in the treated groups are the same as those in
the comparison groups. The long time series of the data where we observe criminal
activity later in life of cohorts who were not a￿ected by the reform but went to
school in municipalities that later implemented the reform and indeed also for several
cohorts that went to the new school system allows us to present some corroborative
evidence in support of the common trends assumption.
Our ￿rst approach is the linear probability model where
Pr(y

i;m;t > 0jRi;m;t;ti;Mi) =  + 1Ri;m;t + 1ti + 2Mi:
This is straightforward to estimate by GLS. However, the linear probability model
has the well known disadvantage that it does not restrict the probabilities to lie on
the [0,1] interval. The main reason we use it is for computational convenience, given
the fact that there are about 1,000 municipality and 11 cohort ￿xed e￿ects.
As an alternative, we also estimate a logit model by minimum distance: ￿rst we
group the data by municipality and cohort and estimate the within-cell conviction
probability (Pmt). We then use minimum distance to impose the restriction that
this probability is generated from a logistic distribution with a linear index as in the









We drop all cells where the log odds ratio is not de￿ned, which amounts to
about 6% of cells. Implicitly the logit and the LP models deal with such cells as
well as with the nonlinear form of the probabilities in a di￿erent way and hence it
is interesting to see if we get di￿erent results with the two approaches.
6 Results
6.1 The First Generation
Tables 4 through 7 show the estimates of the causal e￿ect on criminal behavior of
being assigned to the reform. Tables 4 and 5 show the results for the probability of
having ever been convicted for the linear probability and logit model, respectively.
Table 6 shows the results for the probability of having ever been convicted to a
prison sentence using the linear probability model and, ￿nally, Table 7 shows the
e￿ect of the reform on the intensity to engage in crime measures by the number of
crimes an individual was convicted for. Throughout, we present results for the entire
sample of men as well as separately for those coming from homes with low educated
fathers. All speci￿cations include ￿xed e￿ects for birth municipality as well as birth
cohorts and the standard errors are corrected for clustering within municipality of
birth, allowing for both spatial and serial correlation. 13
To avid the computational di￿culties involved in estimating a logit model with
1,000 municipality ￿xed e￿ects and 11 cohorts we use a minimum distance procedure.
13On clustering the standard errors see Moulton (1990).
24We collapse the sample to 10,744 municipality-cohort cells by computing the log-
odds ratio within each cell. For 691 municipality-cohort cells the proportion of
observed crime was zero and hence the log-odds ratio is not de￿ned. For 108 cells
we cannot assign the reform status, which leaves us with 9,949 municipality-cohort
observations. We then regress the log-odds ratio on the municipality and cohort
dummies as well as on the reform indicator using GLS. Each cell was weighted by
p
pc(1   pc)Nc, where Nc is the cell size and pc is the within cell probability of
a conviction. The corresponding marginal e￿ects for di￿erent cohorts of the logit
model are presented in Table 5. For the estimates when prison sentences are used
as dependent variable this is not possible since the proportion of prison sentences is
too small, which prevents us from computing the log-odds ratios.
Column (1) in Tables 4 and 5shows a negative, but insigni￿cant e￿ect of the
reform on the probability of having ever been convicted for the entire sample born
between 1945 and 1955 and, in the lower panel of the tables, a similar result for
those originating from homes with low educated fathers. However, these results
may be diluted by the fact that the oldest birth cohorts in our data are quite old
when we start to collect data on convictions and therefore may have ended their
criminal careers. For example, the oldest cohort included, those born in 1945, are
aged 36 when we start to record their criminal behavior. This is an age by which a
large proportion have already stopped committing crimes.
To account for this possibility, we also present results where we have restricted
the sample to younger birth cohorts. Columns (2) through (6) in Tables 4 and 5
show results for the impact of the reform on di￿erent cohort groups. Although,
we clearly loose some precision as we reduce the number of cohorts considered, the
results show a clear pattern for both the entire sample and those originating from
25homes with low educated fathers: for younger cohorts, which are observed at the
age range when more crimes are committed, the reform seems to have increasingly
strong e￿ects. The estimate for the youngest cohort, born in 1954 or 1955, is highly
signi￿cant suggesting a 1.3 percentage points decrease in crime; this corresponds to
a 5 percent, decrease in the probability of ever been convicted as a result of being
assigned to the post reform school system. The e￿ect is somewhat larger in the sub-
sample of men born in homes with low educated fathers. These results are consistent
with ￿ndings by Lochner and Moretti (2004) and Machin, Marie, and Vuji¢ (2010)
for the US and the UK respectively, who show that increases in compulsory schooling
led to reductions in crime.
To analyze if the education reform also decreased the amount of crimes individ-
uals were convicted for we use an alternative outcome variable that measures the
total number of crimes an individual has been convicted for between 1981 and 2008.
The average number of convicted crimes for men in the ￿rst generation ranges from
1.2 to 1.8, depending on cohort and father’s education level. This outcome variable
is characterized by a large mass point at zero and overdispersion with a variance
roughly ten times larger than the mean. To estimate the model on this outcome
variable we use a negative binomial model. Table 7 presents the marginal e￿ects
from these estimates. The estimates are negative and signi￿cant at the 10 percent
level for those born between 1950 and 1955 in homes with low educated fathers.
The e￿ect seems to be somewhat stronger for those born between 1952-1955 and
1953-1955, respectively. These results are in line with the ￿ndings on the probability
of having ever been convicted.
26Table 4: Linear Probability Model estimates of the e￿ects of the reform on the probability
of ever been convicted. Marginal e￿ects are scaled by 100. Estimations by birth cohorts
for the entire sample and for men with low educated fathers separately. Men born in
Sweden between 1945 and 1955.
Panel A Men born 45-55
Cohorts 45-55 50-55 51-55 52-55 53-55 54-55
Probability conviction 0:2531 0:2683 0:2714 0:2746 0:2783 0:2837
Reform -0.645 -0.456 -0.532* -1.028*** -1.076** -1.329***
(0.405) (0.305) (0.318) (0.396) (0.490) (0.479)
Percentage change -2.548 -1.700 -1.960 -3.744 -3.866 -4.685
Share convicted
Observations 622,583 319,093 263,592 210,399 157,155 103,761
Panel B Men born 45-55 with low educated father
Cohorts 45-55 50-55 51-55 52-55 53-55 54-55
Probability conviction 0:2396 0:2517 0:2552 0:2588 0:2631 0:2693
Reform -0.263 -0.494 -0.579 -1.119* -1.103 -2.094**
(0.304) (0.434) (0.486) (0.661) (0.912) (0.970)
Percentage change -1.098 -1.963 -2.269 -4.324 -4.192 -7.776
Share convicted
Observations 264,679 150,620 125,952 101,266 76,207 50,222
Notes: The table presents results from a linear probability (LP) estimation with weighted least
squares. The used weights are:
p
x0b(1   x0b), which are obtained from a ￿rst stage OLS estimation.
The level of observation are men born between between 1945-1955, or men born in cohorts indicated
at the top of each column; Reform is a dummy variable indicating the reform status of the index
person. All regressions include a full set of birth municipality dummies and birth cohort dummies.
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality of birth. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
6.2 The Child Generation
Tables 8 and 9 report the results of the di￿erence-in-di￿erences estimation of the
e￿ects of the school reform on criminal participation of the child generation for the
probability of ever been convicted and prison convictions, respectively. Again, for
the probability of being convicted, we additionally estimate a logit model based
on cohort-municipality cells. We estimate two speci￿cations. In the ￿rst one, we
estimate the e￿ects of a father who has been subjected to the new school system on
27Table 5: Logit model marginal e￿ects of the reform on the probability of ever been
convicted. Marginal e￿ects are scaled by 100. Estimations by birth cohorts for the
entire sample and for men with low educated fathers separately. Men born in Sweden
between 1945 and 1955.
Panel A Men born 45-55
Cohorts 45-55 50-55 51-55 52-55 53-55 54-55
Probability conviction 0:253 0:268 0:271 0:275 0:278 0:284
Reform -0.023 -0.284 -0.434 -1.274* -0.999 -1.395
(0.281) (0.422) (0.500) (0.654) (0.911) (1.361)
Percentage change -0.091 -1.057 -1.598 -4.639 -3.591 -4.916
Share convicted
Observations 622,583 319,093 263,592 210,399 157,155 103,761
Panel B Men born 45-55 with low educated father
Cohorts 45-55 50-55 51-55 52-55 53-55 54-55
Probability conviction 0:234 0:252 0:255 0:259 0:263 0:269
Reform -0.022 -0.272 -0.417 -1.227* -0.965 -1.351
(0.271) (0.405) (0.480) (0.630) (0.879) (1.318)
Percentage change -0.093 -1.081 -1.633 -4.741 -3.666 -5.015
Share convicted
Observations 264,679 150,620 125,952 101,266 76,207 50,222
Notes: We only report marginal e￿ects of the logit model; Reform is a dummy variable indicat-
ing the reform status of the index person. All regressions include a full set of birth municipality
dummies and birth cohort dummies. The level of observation are men born between 1945-1955,
or men born in cohorts indicated at the top of each column. Robust Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered by municipality of birth of the individual. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
child criminal behavior and in the second one the corresponding e￿ects of a mother
going through the post reform school system.
We distinguish between four samples. The ￿rst is the sample of individuals whose
father was born between 1945 and 1955 for which we estimate the e￿ect of their
father’s school reform assignment on their probability of a conviction. The second
sample are individuals whose mother was born between 1945 and 1955, for which we
estimate the e￿ect of their mother’s school reform assignment on their son’s criminal
behavior. The other two samples are individuals originating from the low educated
28Table 6: Linear Probability Model estimates of the e￿ects of the reform on the probability of
ever been convicted to a prison sentence. Marginal e￿ects are scaled by 100. Estimations by
birth cohorts for the entire sample and for men with low educated fathers separately. Men
born in Sweden between 1945 and 1955.
Sample Men born 45-55 Men born 45-55 with low educated fathers
Probability prison  p = 0:0538  p = 0:0505
Reform -0.149 -0.049
(0.160) (0.170)
Corresponding percentage -2.770 -0.974
change share prison
Observations 622,583 264,679
Notes: The table presents results from a linear probability (LP) estimation with weighted least squares.
The used weights are:
p
x0b(1   x0b), which are obtained from a ￿rst stage OLS estimation. The level
of observation are men born between 1945-1955. 5.38% of all men in the considered sample have been
convicted to prison at least once. 5.05% of the considered sample who have a low educated father have
been to prison. Robust Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality of birth. *** p <0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reform is a dummy indicating the reform status of the index person. All regressions
include a full set of birth municipality dummies and birth cohort dummies.
grandparent generation. More speci￿cally, the third sample is de￿ned like the ￿rst
one, but restricted to those individuals whose grandfather on the father’s side is low
educated. Finally, the fourth sample is restricted to those individuals within the
second sample whose grandfathers on their mother’s side are low educated.
When we collapse the data set by cohort-municipality level as a ￿rst step to
estimating the logit model, we do it by father’s cohort-municipality level which gives
us 10,607 cells for the father’s sample, and 10,247 for the sample with low educated
paternal grandfathers. For the speci￿cation with mother’s reform assignment we
collapse the data by mother’s cohort-municipality level which leads to 10,647 for the
entire sample and 10,324 for the low educated maternal grandfathers sample.
Table 8 reports the marginal e￿ects of the linear probability model for a con-
viction (denoted by LP), the log-odds ratio estimate for the logit model, and the
corresponding marginal e￿ect of the logit model, both for the sample of all sons,
and for sons whose grandfather was low educated. It can be seen that the reform
29Table 7: Marginal e￿ects of negative binomial estimation of the e￿ects of
the reform on the number of crimes men have been convicted for between
1981-2008. Estimations by birth cohorts for the entire sample and for men
with low educated fathers separately. Men born in Sweden between 1945
and 1955.
Sample Men born 45-55
Cohorts 45-55 50-55 51-55 52-55 53-55 54-55
 y 1.309 1.578 1.646 1.696 1.748 1.828
Reform 0.027 -0.071 -0.038 -0.122 -0.078 -0.121
(0.035) (0.062) (0.067) (0.086) (0.083) (0.092)
Observations 622,583 319,093 263,592 210,399 157,155 103,761
Sample Men born 45-55 with low educated fathers
Cohorts 45-55 50-55 51-55 52-55 53-55 54-55
 y 1.253 1.473 1.539 1.587 1.647 1.717
Reform -0.030 -0.137* -0.117 -0.250** -0.236* -0.177
(0.047) (0.081) (0.096) (0.124) (0.128) (0.168)
Observations 264,679 150,620 125,952 101,266 76,207 50,222
Notes: Margnial e￿ects of the negative binomial estimation are reported. Reform is
a dummy indicating the reform status of the individual. Robust Standard errors in
parentheses, clustered by individual’s municipality of birth. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. All regressions include a full set of birth municipality dummies and birth
cohort dummies of the index person. The estimation method is a negative bino-
mial model to relax the Poisson model assumption of equal conditional mean and
conditional variance of the outcome variable, but maintaining an exponential mean.
signi￿cantly reduces the probability of having ever been convicted for the sons of
fathers who went through the reform by 0.6 percentage points, see column (LP).
Since the average share of convicted individuals in this cohort was about 26.5 per-
cent, reduction in criminality was approximately 2.5 percent.
The log-odds-ratio estimates from the logit model translate into a marginal ef-
fect of a 0.646 percentage points decrease in the probability of a conviction, which
is very similar to the marginal e￿ect obtained from the linear probability model.
Hence, the logit model suggests similar to the linear probability model, that father’s
reform assignment signi￿cantly reduces the total share of convicted men by about
2.5 percent.
30Consider now the sample of sons with a low educated paternal grandfather. The
impact of their father being assigned to the reform is a reduction of the probability
of conviction by 1.02 percentage points. This translates into a 4.13 percent decrease
in the share of convicted sons of low educated grandfathers (24.7 percent). The
marginal e￿ect of the logit model is of the same magnitude (-0.97 percentage points,
and -3.94 percent decrease in total share of convicted).
There are no signi￿cant e￿ects of reform assignment of mothers on the probability
of a conviction of their sons neither for the entire sample of sons, nor for those with
a low educated maternal grandfather. Also, as can be seen in Table 9, the results of
the linear probability model for the e￿ects of the reform status of father and mother
on the probability of a prison sentence of sons show no signi￿cant e￿ects.
Table 10 shows the negative binomial estimates of the marginal e￿ects for the
intensive margin on the number of crimes convicted for between 1981 and 2008 for
the children generation. The top panel A shows the results based on father’s reform
status for all children and those with low educated grandfathers, respectively. The
bottom panel B shows the corresponding results based on mother’s reform status.
The estimate based on father’s reform status shows a signi￿cant negative e￿ect of
the reform based on father’s reform status, which is in line with our ￿ndings on the
probability of being convicted.
We repeated the analysis for the children generation using the suspected crime
data mentioned above. Descriptive tables on suspected crime rates for the relevant
sample of children is presented in the appendix in table 15. Interestingly, the rates
of ever been suspected for a crime including and excluding all tra￿c crimes are very
similar. We ￿nd a negative but not signi￿cant relationship between father’s reform
assignment and sons probability of ever been suspected for a crime. 14






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 9: Linear Probability Model estimates of the e￿ects of father’s and mother’s reform
assignment on the probability of their sons having ever been convicted to a prison sentence.
Marginal e￿ects are scaled by 100. Estimations for the entire sample and for sons with low
educated grandfathers separately. Sons of men and women born in Sweden between 1945
and 1955.
Panel A: Father’s reform assignment
Sample All Sons Sons with low educated grandfather
Probability prison p = 0:034 p = 0:028
Reform_father 0.015 0.005
(0.093) (0.123)
Corresponding percentage 0.448 0.169
Change share prison
Observations 563,754 243,082
Panel B: Mother’s reform assignment
Sample All Sons Sons with low educated grandfather
Probability prison p = 0:034 p = 0:028
Reform_mother 0.038 0.004
(0.093) (0.130)
Corresponding percentage 1.093 0.108
change share prison
Observations 595,138 255,075
Notes: The reported estimates are based on a weighted least squares estimation. 3.43% of all men
in the sample have been to prison. 2.80% of men who have a low educated grandfather on their
father’s side have been convicted to prison. 3.45% of men who have a low educated grandfather on
their mother’s side have been convicted to prison. All regressions include either a full set of birth
municipality dummies of father or mother, and birth cohort dummies of father or mother. Robust
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality of birth of mother or father. *** p <0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A possible mechanism for the inverse e￿ect of the reform on the criminal behavior
of the child generation is through fertility and family formation. An implication of
both the well known quality-quantity model and the time allocation model is that
increased educational attainments and earnings prospects will decrease the demand
for having children. If there is a trade o￿ between the number of children and
parental investments in each child, it may make up an inverse relation between
33Table 10: Marginal E￿ects of negative binomial estimation of father’s or mother’s reform
assignment on the number of crimes sons are convicted of between 1981-2008. Estimations
for the entire sample and for sons with low educated grandfathers separately. Sons of men
and women born in Sweden between 1945 and 1955.
Panel A: Father’s reform assignment
Sample All Sons Sons with low educated grandfather




Panel B: Mother’s reform assignment
Sample All Sons Sons with low educated grandfather




Notes: Marginal e￿ects are reported,  y is the average number of convicted crimes in the sample.
Experiment_father or Experiment_mother is a dummy indicating the reform status of the father
or mother of the son. Robust Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality of birth of
the son’s father (Panel A) or mother (Panel B). *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions
include a full set of birth municipality dummies and birth cohort dummies of father (Panel A)
or mother (Panel B). The estimation method is a negative binomial model to relax the Poisson
model assumption of equal conditional mean and conditional variance of the outcome variable, but
maintaining an exponential mean.
being assigned to the reform and the inverse relation to child criminality.
To further investigate this possible mechanism we estimate the e￿ect of the
reform on fertility behavior. We use four di￿erent outcomes: the total number
of children, the probability of having children, the age at birth of ￿rst child and,
￿nally, the probability of having children while still a teenager. Since we only ￿nd
signi￿cant e￿ects of the reform on sons to fathers a￿ected by the reform, we restrict
the sample to men.15 As can be seen in the results of these estimates shown in table
11, the only signi￿cant e￿ect is on the probability of having a child as a teenager.
15The results for women are qualitatively the same, the only di￿erence is that women who were
assigned to the reform are less likely to ever have a child on a 10 percent signi￿cance level.
34However, since only 1.3 percent of the population have children as teenagers and,
more importantly, the reform only decreased this probability by between 0.2 and 0.3
percent, we conclude that we cannot attribute the e￿ect of the reform to changes
in fertility behavior. The results on all other fertility outcome variables shown are
estimated to be zero.
Table 11: Estimation of the e￿ects of the reform on the probability of ever having
a child, the number of children, the age at birth of ￿rst child and the probability of
teenage paternity. Marginal e￿ects are scaled by 100. Estimations by birth cohorts
for the entire sample and for men with low educated fathers separately. Men born in
Sweden between 1945 and 1955.
Dependent variable ever child number children age birth ￿rst child teenage
Speci￿cation LP Poisson Neg binomial LP
Sample: Men born 45-55
Average dep var 0.813 1.896 27.054 0.017
Reform -0.093 -0.004 0.106 -0.263**
(0.185) (0.007) (0.075) (0.106)
Observations 622,583 622,583 505,679 622,583
Sample: Men born 45-55 with low educated fathers
Average dep var 0.822 1.912 26.524 0.019
Reform -0.096 0.001 0.064 -0.210**
(0.273) (0.010) (0.048) (0.100)
Observations 264,679 264,679 217,517 264,679
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by municipality level. All estimations include a set of
municipality dummies and cohort dummies. The level of observation are men
born between 1945 and 1955, all men born between 1945-1955. Experiment is a
indicator variable for reform assignment.
6.3 The common trends assumption
As is well known, an identifying assumption underlying the di￿erences-in-di￿erences
estimator is that any trend in the outcome variable is common in the treatment and
comparison groups over the period of comparison. This assumption is untestable
35because it relates to the counterfactual change in the treatment group. However,
an indication can be obtained by testing whether the trends are common in the two
sets of groups before the reform and indeed after the reform as well.
In our sample we have 12 groups of municipalities indexed by which cohort was
￿rst assigned to the reform. To implement the common trends test we used only the
municipalities that ￿rst implemented the reform for the 1947 cohort onwards (i.e.
10 of the 12 set of municipalities). We compared the trend of criminal behavior of
individuals across these municipalities for all cohorts that were not a￿ected by the
reform. The pooled regression of these groups is y =  + t + 0m + 0t  m + ,
where m is a set of dummies indicating the group to which the municipality belongs
based on the cohort for which it ￿rst implemented the reform; t is a linear trend
that represents the cohorts 1945-1955. A joint test of 1 = 2 = ::: = 10 = 0 gives a
F statistic of F(9;7,090)=1.15 with P=0.323, with 7,090 cohort-municipality cells
before treatment. This implies the hypothesis of common trends in crime for the
pre-treatment cohorts for all groups of municipalities cannot be rejected.
For post-treatment trends in crime we only compare crime between the munici-
palities that implemented the reform for cohorts born before 1954. We compare the
criminal behavior of individuals across these municipalities for the cohorts a￿ected
by the reform. A joint test of equality of the coe￿cients on the interaction term of
the above pooled model yields F(9, 4,808) with P=0.1303, where 4,808 is the num-
ber of cohort-municipality cells that are treated. This means that the hypothesis of
a common trend in criminal behavior for the treated cohorts is the same across the
groups of municipalities that implemented the reform for di￿erent cohorts cannot
be rejected. Both these tests are strong evidence in favor of the key identifying
assumption for our di￿erence-in-di￿erences approach to the problem.
367 Conclusion
We ￿nd a very strong relation between own educational attainments and criminal
behavior in our data: every year of additional education is associated with a decrease
of about 7.5 percent in the probability of being convicted for a crime and a 15
percent decrease in the probability of a prison sentence. We also ￿nd a strong
relation between parental education and crime. On average, one year of additional
education of the father is associated with an about 2.1 percent decrease in the
probability of being convicted and an about 3.5 percent decrease in the probability
of a prison sentence. To what extent do these strong correlations give guidance to
the likely e￿ects of a policy intervention designed to improve educational attainment
of the least skilled? The staggered implementation of a major Swedish education
reform in the 1950s and early 60s, which among other things increased compulsory
schooling, provides an ideal opportunity to answer this question.
Using administrative data that compares children of the same cohorts, but edu-
cated under di￿erent systems, we ￿nd strong negative and signi￿cant e￿ects of the
reform, particularly when we focus on cohorts whose criminal activity is recorded
at a younger age. Thus, for the youngest cohorts, born between 1954 and 1955,
the point estimate suggests a 1.3 percentage points, corresponding to 5 percent, de-
crease in the probability of being convicted from being assigned to the post reform
school system. In the group from homes with low educated fathers the e￿ect seems
to be somewhat larger, which is consistent with a larger e￿ect on both educational
attainments and labor earnings in this group found in Meghir and Palme (2005).
The striking result of this paper however is the e￿ect of the reform on the children
of those originally a￿ected: there is a signi￿cant e￿ect of paternal assignment to the
reform on the probability of being convicted corresponding to an average reduction of
37about 2.5 percent. However, we found no signi￿cant e￿ect from mother’s assignment
to the reform. The intergenerational e￿ect of education on criminal behavior can
operate through several di￿erent channels. The result that the reform had a stronger
e￿ect on criminal behavior in the child generation - together with the result obtained
in Holmlund, Lindhal, and Plug (forthcoming) that the reform had a weak, although
signi￿cant, e￿ect on the educational attainments in the next generation - suggests
that e￿ect did not operate solely through increased education in the child generation.
Another conceivable channel is through changes in fertility induced by the reform.
Our data allowed us to estimate reform e￿ects on four di￿erent outcomes related to
fertility behavior. Since our results suggest that the e￿ect operated through father’s
reform assignment, we restricted the sample to men. The only signi￿cant e￿ect was
a decreased probability of having a child as teenager. However, the e￿ect was far
too small to serve as a major explanation of the decreased criminality in the next
generation.
Given the data at our disposal, there are several channels that we are not able to
distinguish between. The most obvious one is that improved earnings possibilities
provide the parents with improved economic resources to invest in the upbringing of
their children. However, since crime is also a manifestation of a basic lack of social
skills or other emotional de￿cits it is also conceivable that the e￿ect of parental
education works through other channels than solely economic resources. A possible
interpretation of the fact that we ￿nd signi￿cant e￿ects of the father’s rather than
the mother’s reform assignment on the son’s criminal behavior is consistent with
the notion that these alternative explanations may be important, in view of the fact
that female labor force participation is very high in Sweden.
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428 APPENDIX
8.1 Reform Appendix
Table 12: Quantitative development of the comprehensive school experiment 1949
to 1962.
Year Municipalities Number of Number of
Cumulative Number Percentage share classes students
1949/50 14 1.3 172 2 483
1950/51 20 1.9 379 7 529
1951/52 25 2.4 682 14 635
1952/53 30 2.9 1 009 22 725
1953/54 37 3.5 1 525 35 784
1954/55 46 4.4 2 516 61 498
1955/56 59 5.6 3 394 84 941
1956/57 71 6.7 4 393 109 694
1957/58 96 9.1 5 702 143 370
1958/59 142 13.5 8 036 196 343
1959/60 217 20.6 11 191 266 042
1960/61 295 28.0 14 283 333 094
1961/62 415 39.4 18 665 436 595
Note: The 1952 division of municipalities (total: 1 052). Source: Marklund
438.2 Data appendix




Cohorts 1945-1955 1,340,857 685,056 655,801
Father’s education available 881,742 452,433 429,309
Of which low educated father 560,273 287,396 272,877
Percent 63.54 63.52 63.56
Children generation:
All children of parent generation 1,621,758 833,564 788,194
Paternal grandfather’s education available 802,451 412,619 389,832
Of which with low educated grandfather 511,980 263,319 248,661
Percent 63.80 63.82 63.79
Maternal grandfather’s education available 836,632 430,357 406,275
Of which with low educated grandfather 538,228 276,779 261,449
Percent 64.33 64.31 64.35
Notes: We only present the number of observations that are available on father’s and
grandfather’s education level, because we will condition on father’s or grandfather’s
education level in the analysis. We only have information on the highest level of
education for those individuals that are not older than 60 years in the year of the 1970
census. We report the number of individuals in each sample, the number of individuals
for whome we have information on the highest level of education on their fathers or
grandfathers and the share of those for which we have this information with the lowest
education level. For the children generation with low educated grandfathers on their
father’s side of the family, we consider those children whose father was born between
1945 and 1955. For the children generation with low educated grandfathers on the
mother’s side of the family we consider those whose mother was born between 1945
and 1955.
44Table 14: Number of all convictions in Sweden between 1981-2008
All Male Female
Number of convicted persons 1,249,569 966,790 282,779
Number of persons convicted for prison 366,639 344,919 21,720
Number of convictions in total 3,014,811 2,534,337 480,474
Number of prison sentences in total 1,204,711 1,115,428 89,283
Convictions by age group
age 15 -24 1,128,125 950,413 177,712
age 25-34 710,177 605,445 104,732
age 35-44 577,693 483,821 93,872
age 45-54 355,396 296,971 58,425
age 55-64 161,367 133,788 27,579
age 65-80 76,296 59,138 17,158
age > 80 5,757 4,761 996
78% to 85% of the convictions are males.
Table 15: Data on all suspected crimes in Sweden between 1991-2009. Sons
of men or women born 1945-1955.
Number of persons suspected for a crime 1991-2009
All crimes Excluding tra￿c Excluding some tra￿c
Sample: Sons of men born 45-55
129,683 117,279 124,487
Percent of sample 20.95 18.94 20.11
Sample: Sons of men born 45-55 with low educated father
54,542 48,888 52,222
Percent of sample 20.71 18.57 19.83
Sample: Sons of women born 45-55
133,953 120,748 129,217
Percent of sample 20.50 18.48 19.78
Sample: Sons of women born 45-55 with low educated father
55,210 49,294 129,217
Percent of sample 19.95 17.81 19.78
Notes: The category excluding all tra￿c crimes excludes the crime cate-
gories listed in table 17. The category excluding some tra￿c crimes ex-
cludes the categories "Driving without a license", "Allowed driving with-
out license" and "Override provision".
45Figure 2: Life cycle convicted crimes
Figure 3: Life cycle convicted crimes
46Table 16: Persons found guilty of criminal o￿ences, by principal o￿ence
Number of Share, %
convictions, 2009
Crimes against penal code 59,542 42.1
Of which
Crimes against life and health 9,744 6.9
Of which
Murder and man-slaughter 150 0.1
Assault, gross assault 9,268 6.5
Sexual o￿ences 1,090 0.8
Of which:
Rape 256 0.2
Theft, robbery, other o￿ences of stealing 29,393 20.8
Of which:
Theft, gross theft 9,233 6.5
Petty theft 17,953 12.7
Robbery, gross robbery 1,049 0.7
Vehicle theft 824 0.6
Fraud and other dishonesty 3,175 2.2
Crimes in￿icting damage 3,316 2.3
Violent threat to public servant 2,544 1.8
Other 10,280 7.3
Crimes to other penal legislation 82,035 57.9
Crimes against the Road tra￿c o￿ences act 47,020 33.2
Of which
Drunken driving, gross drunken driving 13,253 9.4
Crimes against the Narcotics drugs act 18,525 13.1
Crimes against the Act on smuggling 2,076 1.5
Other 14,414 10.2
All crimes 141,577 100
Persons found guilty of criminal o￿ences, by principal o￿ence, 2009. Source:
Kriminalstatistik, R￿ttsstatistisk ￿rsbok, Statistisk ￿rsbok, Statistiska Med-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































48Table 18: Linear probability estimates of the association of own education
levels and criminal behavior. Men born between 1945-1955.
Dependent variables Probability conviction Probability prison




Upper secondary -7.471*** -3.928***
(1.028) (0.287)







Notes: Results are scaled by 100. Level of observation are men born between 1945
and 1955 in Sweden. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by birth mu-
nicipality. Signi￿cance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include
a full set of birth cohort dummies and birth municipality dummies.
49Table 19: Linear probability model estimates of the association of parental edu-
cation levels and own criminal behavior. Sons of parents born 1945-1955.
Dependent variables Probability conviction Probability prison
 p = 0:2645  p = 0:0343
Panel A: Education levels father
Vocational -2.075*** -0.694***
(0.214) (0.088)
Upper secondary -8.083*** -2.342***
(0.339) (0.142)







Panel B: Education levels mother
Vocational -4.356*** -1.556***
(0.291) (0.102)
Upper secondary -8.119*** -2.648***
(0.473) (0.181)







Notes: Level indicates a dummy for each education level. The omitted education level is
the lowest education level combined levels 1 and 2. Level of observation are sons of parents
born between 1945 and 1955 in Sweden. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
by birth municipality. Signi￿cance levels *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions
include a full set of birth cohort dummies and birth municipality dummies.
50